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NOTES
LAW AND LIFE: ORGAN TRANSPLANTS
I. INTRODUCTION
It is the purpose of this paper to summarize some of the
legal, moral, medical and ethical issues that have recently
arisen as a result of the current rapid advances in medical
science in prolonging life. Particular emphasis is given to
the state of the medical art as well as the state of the law in
South Carolina. While South Carolina may not be faced with
the actual problems in the immediate future, it would be
well to consider the issues in advance with the hope that
legal, moral and ethical considerations will not act as a bar-
rier to medical advancement nor will the interests of society
be sacrificed in the name of scientific progress.
II. MEDICAL BACKGROUND
A. Transplantation
Most discussions of the history of transplantation begin
with John Brinkley, one of the best known quacks of our
century. Brinkley claimed to be able to restore lost virility
by transplanting goat testes into his male patients.' The
success of the technique2 was purportedly demonstrated by
the subsequent pregnancy of the spouse, but most investi-
gators believe that another aspect of the "treatment"-the
requirement that the patient and his wife reside temporarily
close by the doctor-was responsible for the apparent result.
About the same time in Europe, Dr. Serge Voronoff
was providing his similarly situated patients with the well
known monkey glands-again testes, but this time from apes.
Voronoff did not limit himself to old men, however, and
claimed successful transplantation of the glands to other
needy animals as well.3
1. Walford, A Matter of Life and Death, THE ATLANTIc MONTHLY,
Aug. 1967, at 66.
2. This is referred to as a heterograft or heterotransplantation, i.e.,
between different species. Autograft refers to a graft in which the donor
is also the recipient. Isograft is a graft between individuals with identical
antigens (as in identical twins). Homograft refers to grafts between
genetically dissimilar members of the same species, i.e., unrelated humans.
3. Walford, supra note 1, at 66.
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The works of these two gentlemen were marked by the
skepticism of the orthodox medical world of their time and
especially by self-generated ballyhoo and publicity which is
universally frowned on in medical circles. It should be noted
that the widespread coverage by the communications media
of the very recent transplants has been of concern to some
medical groups because such coverage varies from the ac-
cepted procedure of technical reporting first to a peer group
and because of the appearance of the surgeon celebrity.4
Nevertheless, it should also be noted that the greater public
awareness has had a beneficial result on donor availability.
Autografts. At the same time Brinkley and Voronoff were
performing their "rejuvenations," more serious work was
being done by Dr. Alexis Carrel and Dr. Charles Guthrie;
their work is responsible in part for the status of transplanta-
tion today." In a brilliant series of experiments covering sev-
eral years and culminating in a Nobel Prize, Carrel and Guth-
rie first demonstrated functional success in a kidney trans-
plant from one dog to another.8 The kidney functioned, but the
donee dog died after nine days. Later transplants produced
successes in which the animals survived for several weeks.
But the big breakthrough came when it was discovered that
kidneys could be replanted in the same animal and that the
animal did not then die.7 The success of the autotransplants
and the failure of the homotransplants could not be explained
by differences in surgical technique or infection but was
thought to be some sort of biological phenomenon.8 Though
this problem, rejection of foreign tissue, is better understood
today, its solution is not yet complete.
Autografts have progressed extensively and replantations
of accidentally severed arms have been accomplished. 9 Freed
from the rejection phenomenon, autotransplants seem limited
4. Elkinton, When Do We Let the Patients Die?, 68 ANNALs op IN-
TRNAL MEDICINE 695 (1968).
5. Wasmuth & Stewart, Medical and Legal Aspects of Human Organ
Transplantation 14 CLEv.-MAR. L. REv. 442, 443 (1965).
6. Maisel, he Miracle of Surgical Transplants, READER's DIGEST,
Mar. 1968, at 67.
7. Carrel, The Ultimate Result of a Double Nephrectomy and Re-
plantation of One Kidney, 14 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL MEDICINE 124 (1911).
8. Maisel, supra note 6, at 67.
9. Kiser & Kolff, When Is Transplantation of Organs Feasible or
Practical?, DISEASE-A-MONTH, Sept. 1967, at 5; Walford, supra note 1, at
66.
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only by surgical skill and the length of time the organ can
be deprived of bodily support. It has even been suggested
that a kidney, requiring surgical repair, could be removed
from the patient, repaired "at the table side," and then re-
placed as an autotransplant. 10
Isogrfts. A major step forward in human organ trans-
plantation was made in 1954 when a surgical team at Boston's
Peter Bent Brigham Hospital transplanted the healthy kid-
ney of one brother to replace the diseased kidney of his
identical twin." Isografts were shown to avoid the rejection
phenomenon just as had autografts. Many more isografts
have been completed since that first one and a very high
degree of success has been obtained.12 This success is very
limited, of course, for two obvious reasons. Twin donors are
quite rare, and also the donor must have two of the needed
organs and be able to survive with only one. Thus the
need is clear for a method permitting the use of organs
from unrelated recently deceased humans.
Homografts. After Carrel's successful autografts, he and
many other investigators directed their attention toward
solution of the rejection problem. Another Nobel prizewin-
ner, Peter Medowar, associated rejection with the body's
immunity reaction to disease and infection.'3 This was dem-
onstrated in a series of experiments by the so called "second-
set phenomenon."' 4 Rejection occurred much more quickly
when a donee rabbit received a second graft from the same
donor rabbit, similar to the body's building an immunity
after exposure to a disease.
Other experiments with mice showed that the tendency
to reject was increased as the genetic difference between
donor and donee increased.' 5
Several approaches have been taken in order to overcome
the body's tendency to reject foreign, though life-giving,
grafts or transplants. An early attempt was the use of
10. Kiser & Kolff, supra note 9, at 6.
11. Id.; Wasmuth & Stewart, supra note 5, at 443; Maisel, supra note
6, at 68.
12. Kiser & Kolff, supra note 9, at 6.
13. Id. at 7; Walford, supra note 1, at 67; Medowar, Behavior and
Fate of Skin Autografts and Skin Homografts in Rabbits, 78 J. ANATOMY
176 (1944).
14. Walford, supra note 1, at 67.
15. Id.
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radiation therapy, which was known to reduce the body's
defenses. The result was too much of a good thing because
the proper dosage was nearly lethal itself.16
Other approaches have been more successful. Certain drugs,
such as azathioprine, have a suppressive effect on immuno-
rejection.17 The technique of suppression by drugs has been
employed in many kidney transplants and in the recent heart
transplants with some degree of success. Much effort con-
tinues in the area of improving the drugs because they have
the same drawback as the radiation technique did. The body's
ability to fight off infection is seriously reduced at a time
when the body is in a weakened condition. Again the cure
can become as dangerous as the malady.
A third approach requires "typing" of tissues of the donor
and donee, much as blood must be type-matched before trans-
fusions; this "typing" is, however, much more complicated. 8
The drawback to this approach is that the process of typing
is difficult and time consuming, and time is usually critical.
Also it is rare, at this point in time, that there is much
choice available as to donor and donee, regardless of their
histo-compatibility. But at least, the severity of the immuno-
suppressant treatment may be reduced when there is genetic
similarity between donor and donee.
Heterografts. The final category of grafts and transplanta-
tion has had the least degree of success but may bear the
greatest promise for the future. Transplants between ani-
mals of different species have resulted in severe immuno-
logical reaction and rejection. In 1964 the heart of a chimpan-
zee was given to a dying man at the University of Mississippi
Medical Center,'0 who died shortly thereafter. This type
transplant is no longer considered bizarre. Dr. George Huf-
nagel of Georgetown University Medical School has suggested
transplantation to humans of unborn calf hearts.20 Dr. Chris-
tian Barnard, on the other hand, feels pig hearts would be
preferable. 2' In Great Britain, a defective heart valve has
been replaced with the valve of a pig's heart,22 and in Tel
16. Kiser & Kolff, supra note 9, at 8.
17. Id.
18. Walford, supra note 1, at 67-68.
19. NEwsWEEK, Dec. 18, 1967, at 89.
20. SCIENCE NEws, Jan. 27, 1968, at 91.
21. Id.
22. U.S. NEws & WoRLu REPORT, Jan. 22, 1968, at 58.
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Aviv, a calf's heart valve has been used.23 Attempts have
been made to transplant baboon and chimpanzee kidneys to
humans.24 Surprisingly, a nine month survival of a chimpan-
zee-man kidney heterotransplant has been reported. 25 All this
may be quite significant, since complete success in this area
could solve all legal and logistic problems, leaving, perhaps,
only some moral and prejudicial reluctance.
Current Status. In a field as rapidly moving as this one,
any report of current achievements has only short-lived ac-
curacy. A few years ago, skin, bone and blood might have
been thought to be the outer limit of correcting one body's
defects with matter from another. Today there have been
reported, 26 in varying degrees of success, transplants of the
stomach, small intestines, thyroid and parathyroid glands,
lung, limbs, liver, pancreas, duodenum, kidney and finally the
heart. At the time of this writing there have been more than
two dozen heart transplants and many of the recipients are
leading nearly normal lives. One may well wonder whether
there remains anything further that can be accomplished,
beyond perfecting the techniques for what has already been
done. The answer is "yes"-the ultimate transplant.
Professor Robert White, director of the Department of
Neurosurgery at Cleveland Metropolitan General Hospital,
has stated that, while it would not now be possible to replace
a brain within a skull, it is entirely possible to transplant an
entire head.27 This and other more difficult operations have
already been performed on animals under circumstances more
complicated than they would be with humans. Professor
White feels that the first head transplant will be accomplished
in Japan, apparently because the moral problem will not be
a barrier there.2
8
While there may be moral barriers halting progress to the
"ultimate transplants," there are presently difficult legal
barriers hampering the usefulness of the proven techniques.
It has been estimated by the Special Committee on the Uni-
form Anatomical Gift Act that up to 100,000 lives per year
23. Id.; ScIENcE NEws, Jan. 27, 1968, at 91.
24. Kiser & Kolff, supra note 9, at 7.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 4.
27. Fallacy, The Dead Body and the Living Brain, LooK, Nov. 28,
1967, at 106.
28. Id. at 108.
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could be saved through kidney transplantation alone. To that
figure can be added several hundred thousands more who
could be saved by other organs. But the Committee states
that "[tihe most formidible obstacle . . . is the legal situa-
tion.,,29
Logistics and Timing. An available supply of fresh organs
is the goal. Organ transplants are now usually made only as
a last resort and at a time when it appears that death is
otherwise certain. There is little selectivity as to the time
the operation should be performed. At the present time,
eye corneas are the only tissue which can be preserved for
any length of time. Thus for the successful heart transplant
to take place, there must be an available donor at the same
time the donee's condition becomes critical.
With kidney patients, some leeway is provided by the use
of the artificial kidney machine by the donee and by the fact
that the kidney may be successfully transplanted up to one
hour after its removal.30 Of course, the timing and logistic
problems are further reduced if a live donor is willing to
make a kidney available when required.
With a heart patient, the problems are considerably more
difficult. First, the patient cannot be maintained on the heart-
lung machine more than five to six hours.3 ' The heart must
be removed from the donor within 30 minutes 32 to prevent
its deterioration. And lastly, and perhaps most significantly,
the donor must die at the right time. If the donor dies before
the donee can be prepared, the heart may deteriorate be-
yond usefulness; if the donor lingers, he may outlive the
donee.33
B. Other Life-Prolonging Advances
Without going into any detail, a word should be said about
other techniques which generate legal issues to be developed
29. UNiFORn AATomICAL GmFr ACT, Prefatory Note at 3 (Tent. Draft
No. 2, 1968).
30. Wasmuth & Stewart, su ra note 5, at 445.
31. Lear, A Realistic Look at Heart Transplants, SATURDAY REVIW,
Feb. 3, 1968, at 58.
32. TIME, Dec. 15, 1967, at 64; Bus -Ess WEEx, Dec. 2, 1967, at 100.
33. In Los Angeles a number of hospitals have combined in an effort
to set up the first organ "pool." All the required information on patients
and consenting donors is computerized and matched. When a prospective
donor dies, the organ or organs are removed and rushed to the selected
donee or donees. U.S. NEWs & Woo REPORT, Jan. 22, 1968, at 58.
770 Vol. 20
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subsequently. Mention has already been made of the artificial
kidney machine and the heart-lung machine. Other elaborate
mechanical devices exist which can be substituted for the
body's defective organs, thus delaying death. Perhaps no
one today would lift an eyebrow to know that an artificial
kidney or an artificial heart could provide continued life for
a patient. But the fact is that in some cases the use of all
the machines may be required to sustain life. "Life" may be
preserved in this manner after the "death" of the brain. This
technique may also be employed to delay the death of a
potential organ donor as a partial solution to the logistic
problem. The issues surround the continued "life" of what
is referred to as a "human vegetable."
Another bizarre technique is now being employed to cheat
death. The science of cryogenics (supercooling), so useful in
the physical sciences, has been used to preserve recently de-
ceased victims of disease with the hope that, upon the dis-
covery of a cure for the disease, the subject can be resuscitated
and cured.34
With this background, we may turn to the issues, some
of which may be new, others of which may be just becoming
apparent.
III. THE LEGAL, MORAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES
The legal issues brought to light by recent medical ad-
vances may be divided into three categories. First are the
issues which have arisen as a direct result of, and bearing
directly upon, the ability to perform the new procedures.
Second are issues which were already lurking in the back-
ground, but which were brought to the public's attention
only by recent publicity. The third category of legal issues
may be entirely independent of the new techniques; the de-
sirability of consistency in the law may require updating
legal concepts to conform with the increase in scientific and
medical knowledge.
The moral and ethical considerations surrounding the area
of forestalling death are properly beyond the scope of this
paper. But it is at least well to know that they exist. The
law can only deal with specific facts after an irrevocable
decision has been made. Yet the factors influencing that
34. Wainwright, The Cold Way to New Life, LiE, Jan. 27, 1967, at 16.
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decision will not only be the state of the law, but also the
moral and ethical codes by which the attending physician
may be bound.
In the final analysis, society, by a process of prag-
matic political accommodation, will assign its own
priorities. And in doing so it will have to make up
its mind collectively as to what extent, and at what
cost, one segment of society is to have life prolonged
by borrowing organs from the rest of society.35
A. The Legal Issues
"Death." As has been mentioned, three categories of legal
issues may be envisioned; this particular one may overlap
all three categories. In the case of vital organ transplants
when the donor has but a single such organ, the donor's
death is a condition precedent to the organ's removal. In
addition, we may well inquire whether the medical practice
need standardize the concept of death or whether a dual
standard may be employed when the dying patient is not a
perspective donor. And lastly, should areas of the law en-
tirely independent of medical practice be reexamined and
made consistent with a new concept of death. An example
would be the definition of death in the simultaneous death
cases.
The lawyer, usually in court long after death has occurred,
thinks of this topic as "a matter of proof."3 6 He rarely thinks,
or needs to think, of the fact sought to be proved. The doctor,
on the other hand, usually is interested only in the presence
or the absence of certain vital signs of life. Of course there
may be errors in the detection of the signs, and South Caro-
linians will recall the recent instance of a local soldier pro-
nounced dead in Vietnam only to be found alive by the mor-
tician and subsequently saved.
It is not error in application of the test which is now of
concern; rather, the questions are: Were the correct tests
used, and what facts did the tests show? Or stated in an-
other fashion, what is death, and what tests may validly be
used to determine the existence of that state?
85. Elklnton, supra note 4, at 699.
86. As to proof of death and a listing of the signs indicating death see
4 Am. Jun. PROOF OF FAcTs Death §§ 4-6 (1960).
772 [Vol. 20
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Traditionally, the cessation of heartbeat and respiration
have indicated that life no longer remains within the body.T
Legally, unless contradicted, proof that a physician certified
the lack of heartbeat and breathing suffices. This provides
the foundation for the statement of lawyer-doctor Carl E.
Wasmuth that "[a] patient is legally dead when the doctor
says he is dead." 88
We now know, of course, that these tests are no longer
completely valid. A sizeable number of patients are walking
around today who have suffered cardiac arrests only to have
their hearts restarted through external chest massage or
direct heart massage. Other patients continue to live only
because their hearts receive artificial stimulation impulses
from electric pacemakers. 39 Thus the fact of heart stoppage
cannot be equated with death.
Similarly, cessation of respiration and lack of capacity to
continue breathing cannot indicate death, as evidenced by
patients supported by mechanical respirators or "iron lungs."
Nor is there any reason to suggest that the simultaneous
stoppage-of heart beat and respiration indicate death when,
in fact, they are restarted by surgical or mechanical tech-
niques.
Advanced opinion today is that "death" should be equated
with brain death. When the brain is irrevocably and irre-
versably damaged so that "chances of recovery of conscious-
ness have been totally eliminated, brain death has occurred. 40
But this "answer" raises two more questions. What tests can
be trusted to indicate the elimination of the possibility of
recovery of consciousness? And what should be done with
patients whose brain is dead but whose body continues to
live? The latter question is of vital interest to physicians who
face the decision of whether to "turn off the machines. ' 41
"Is this an act of mercy or an act of murder?"42
37. Elkinton, supra note 4, at 697; 4 Am. JuR. PROOF OF FACTS Death
§ 4 (1960).
38. BusINEsS WEEK, Dec. 2, 1967, at 102; NEWSWn, Dec. 18, 1967,
at 87.
39. Elklnton, supra note 4, at 696.
40. Wasmuth & Stewart, supra note 5, at 466.
41. It is doubtful, under existing law, whether the consent of the next-
of-kin matters. Recently, a 13-year-old boy suffered brain death when he
was buried in sand for a half hour. His body was kept alive mechanically,
however, at a cost of $200 per day to his family and over their impassioned
plea that "[i]t would be so much better if he were allowed to die." The
State, Apr. 26, 1968, at 1A, col. 1.
42. Elkinton, supra note 4, at 696.
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Among the tests for brain death, perhaps the most im-
portant employs the electroencephalograph which records the
brain's activity in what is known as "brainwave tracings" or
"EEG tracings." When brain activity ceases, the tracings are
"flat," the ripples becoming straight lines. The difficulty,
even with this more sophisticated technique is the lack of
medical agreement on how long the waves must remain flat.
One authority would require a 4 hour minimum with 24
hours under certain conditions and "in the case of young
children, several days."' 43 Neurologist Dr. Robert S. Schwab
would require 24 hours of flat EEG waves and, in addition,
no muscular or pupillary reflexes and no heartbeat or
respiration other than machine induced. 4 The French Na-
tional Academy of Medicine would require an EEG indication
of no brain activity for 48 hours.45
One further complicating factor bears mentioning before
proceeding to the issue as it affects organ transplant teams,
donors and their physicians. Assume a patient who has heart-
beat, respiration and brain activity. Assume further that
the patient's breathing and heartbeat cease and that his
heart cannot be restarted. It can be shown by means of EEG
tracings that his brain continues to live for about three min-
utes4" before it too dies.
In contemplating these considerations, one is constrained
to conclude that various vital organs of the body may and
do cease to function at different times; that, following ces-
sation, some or all of the organs may be restarted or replaced;
that death does not necessarily result even when some organs
are irrevocably nonfunctional; that, as between the heart and
the brain, the brain is the better indicator of the existence
or non-existence of "the person. '47
A change to a brain-death concept could be extremely bene-
ficial in the vital organ transplant area. If the test for
death were flat brainwave tracings for four hours, this de-
termination could be made simultaneous with recipient prepa-
43. Id. at 697.
44. TinE, May 27, 1966, at 78.
45. Id.
46. Fallacy, supra note 27, passim.
47. "The Rev. Thomas O'Donnell, SJ., former lecturer in medical ethics
at the Georgetown University School of Medicine, regards the heart as an
'efficient pump' with no moral significance whatsoever . . . ." Naws-
WEEx, Dec. 18, 1967, at 87.
[Vol. 20
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ration and tissue typing, while the donor's organs are main-
tained viable through the use of the required artificial
support machines. "Thus a patient's heart could be removed
while it was still beating."S4 Those who have difficulty ac-
cepting the thought of removing a "live," beating heart should
be reminded that some test is necessary and that there is far
less chance of foreclosing possible recovery by the use of the
brain wave test than by permitting the removal of a heart
the instant it ceases beating, as apparently the law would
now permit.
It is submitted, therefore, that the interests of doctor, po-
tential donor and donee, as well as those of society would be
furthered by adopting the more realistic concept of brain
death and that when the equipment is available and when
the instant and certainty of death are critical, flat brain wave
tracings for at least four hours should be the test. It should
be noted that the second tentative draft of the proposed Uni-
form Anatomical Gift Act, to be discussed subsequently, while
attempting to remove legal barriers, fails to deal with this
subject. It would, however, certainly seem to be a suitable
subject for legislation and particularly uniform legislation.
Adopting a new concept of death, beyond refining the
technical aspects of murder on the operating table, may af-
fect other areas of the law. One which comes to mind is
the area of simultaneous death.
A most interesting simultaneous death case is unreported
except by Arthur Garfield Hays in the autobiography of his
legal career, City Lawyer. Indeed, the very issue was whether
"heart death" or "brain death" would be controlling. Though
there was conflicting evidence as to the order of events, the
referee's ruling apparently embodied the rule that a decapi-
tated victim would continue to live until the cessation of his
heart beat. During the trial, examples of guillotinees whose
hearts continued beating for over an hour were given.49
According to the standard proposed herein, the time of death
of one whose head is severed from his body is about three
minutes after the flow of blood to the brain ceases. Perhaps
it could be argued that the instant the head is severed, the
damage is irrevocably done and that that should be the in-
48. Id. at 90.
49. A. HAYs, CrTy LAwYER 451 (1942).
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stant of death. In reply, one could argue that from the instant
an infant's eyes behold the light of day he is irrevocably
doomed and that the concept of life necessarily assumes its
transitoriness and that it continues from the moment brain
waves begin until they cease, regardless of events that may
hasten their cessation.
One might also argue that increased highly technical scien-
tific understanding of biology ought not affect the devolution
of property at all. And that might be true. Indeed, property
law has precedent for declaring its independence of science,
and lawyers will quickly recall the example of the "fertile
octogenarian." Nevertheless, it is the law which fixes itself
onto the decisiveness of the instant of death, and science is
merely providing the proper fact for the application of the
rule.
This principle was adopted by a recent California simul-
taneous death case, In re Estate of Rowley,50 in which the
court said that "[t]his case involves a mixed question of med-
ical science and the rules governing the application of physical
force." r5 ' The court, however, sustained perhaps the most un-
scientific lower court finding of survivorship imaginable. The
two victims had been instantly killed in a high speed automo-
bile accident in which there was evidence that the impact was
away from the driver's side. The coroner, a medical doctor,
had testified :
Mrs. Rowley did die first, by about one hundred
and fifty thousandth of a second . . . . I took the
highway patrolman's report of the speed of the
Cadillac [elsewhere the court noted, "Because of the
delicate nature of the (speedometer) . . . and the
great shock to it, the needle could stop at any
point.]"15 2 and the speed of the Falcon coming to-
gether, and made a rough guess at how much longer
time it took the Falcon to push Mrs. Rowley over
and kill [sic] Cooper. That would be a rough mathe-
matical guess.
53
Finding it to be "within the exclusive province of the trier
of fact to determine the credibility of experts," the court
50. 65 Cal. Rptr. 139 (1967).
51. Id. at 150.
52. Id. at 141, n.2, citing Eramd v. Interstate Bakery Corp., 153 Cal.
App. 2d 590, 601, 351 P2d 19, 25 (1957).
53. Id. at 143.
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NOTES
affirmed the survivorship of Miss Cooper. Perhaps in abusing
scientific principles, the court reached the more desirable
property law and social result by sustaining the moderate
legacy to the estate of Miss Cooper, companion to the wealthy
testatrix.
The Uniform Simultaneous Death Act 54 was enacted to
provide a rule of distribution when no sufficient evidence is
available that one party survived the other and the distribu-
tion would otherwise depend on survivorship. As the court
in Rowley quoted, its enactment was
to supplant the former arbitrary and complicated
presumptions of survivorship with effective, work-
able, and equitable rules applicable to the ever-in-
creasing number of cases where two or more persons
have died under such circumstances that there is
no sufficient evidence to indicate that they have
died otherwise than simultaneously."
The concept of death is difficult as we have seen, and
its timing may be even more difficult. The attempt of
the law to remove the necessity of strained findings by pro-
viding workable distribution rules has not been altogether
successful, as illustrated by the Rowley case. It is with some
misgivings, therefore, that a scientific updating of the con-
cept of death is suggested when we observe courts grasping
at 150,000th's of a second "scientific" straws.
Who Shall Live? The Survival of the "Sickest."
Science finds out ingenious ways to kill
Strong men, and keep alive the weak and ill--
That these a sickly progeny may breed,
Too poor to tax, too numerous to feed.5 6
These words were written shortly after World War I to
illustrate war's effect on humanity. Dr. Ren6 Dubos uses
them to illustrate the position held by some that "as medical
science becomes more effective in prolonging survival, there
will be an increase in the frequency of detrimental genes
allowed to accumulate in our communities. ' 57 This would
54. S.C. CoDE ANN. §§ 19-301 to -308 (1962).
55. In Re Rowley, 65 Cal. Rptr. 139, 144 (1967), citing Azvedo v.
Benevolent Society, 125 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 894, 901, 270 P.2d 948, 952
(1954).
56. R. Dunos, THE DREAMs OF REAso 80 (1961).
57. Id. at 79.
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oppose the genetic upgrading afforded by the naturally oc-
curring rule of "survival of the fittest." Before it can be
inferred that there is any suggestion of Nazi-like theories
of upgrading the race, let it hastily be added that Dr. Dubos
only raised the question of the balance of medical emphasis-
"to increase the ability of the individual and of the social
body to meet the stresses and strains of adversity" or to take
the more negative approach of merely avoiding existing
threats and dangers.58 It is Dr. Dubos' theory that "society
...must decide on the types of threats it is most anxious
to avoid and the kind of health it wants . . ., whether it is
willing to jeopardize the future for the sake of present-day
comfort," and that the knowledge necessary for the choice is
not available."'
The question is whether society should be able to ask the
questions and seek the knowledge. When Dr. Christian Bar-
nard was asked whether he thought there was a public in-
terest in transplant ethics and whether a commission should
at least study the ethics question, he emphatically repiled,
"No! no! no! Such a commission would be an insult to your
doctors. Only doctors have the experience to make such
decisions, and they have been making them for very many
years., 00
Dr. Barnard further suggests that the rule to be utilized
by the doctors is to "[o]perate on the patient who needs
it most,"' 1 the one "who is the sickest patient."62 Thus a
compounding factor is added to the negative approach ques-
tioned by Dr. Dubos; not only is the emphasis on prolonging
the life of the sick, but the sickest. One might well question
both the substance of the rule as well as the assertion that
doctors and not society have the right to influence the choice.
First, most statutes providing for organ donation, includ-
ing the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act 3 and South Carolina's
Gifts of the Human Anatomy Act, 4 permit the donor to
specify the donee or the specific use to be made of the organ.
Of course, organ donors may not frequently be in a position
58. Id. at 86.
59. Id.
60. SCIENCE NEws, Mar. 23, 1968, at 282.
61. The State, Mar. 9, 1968, at 2A, col. 2.
62. Id.
63. UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 3(4) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1968).
64. S.C. CODE ANN. § 9-521 (Supp. 1967).
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to name the intended recipient. They will, more often, name
a physician or institution. But suppose neither of these has
the effect of leaving the decision to the chief of the surgical
team or "the captain of the ship," as Dr. Barnard calls him-
self. So it may very well be that the organ will carry with
it a decision precluding the surgeon's choice.
But, assuming that the choice is the chief surgeon's, is the
degree of sickness the exclusive proper criterion? A National
Institute of Health official asked: "Should... patients come
to the brink of death in a gruesome competition to see who
can get sickest without dying?" 65 Consider competition be-
tween a 95 year old patient who has already been given two
new hearts and who is, nevertheless, sicker than a 35 year
old surgeon with a wife and children, and a very bad heart.
One might question whether the patient "who needs it most"
and the patient "who is sickest" are even the same. In any
case, there is no question which person society needs most.
Suppose, even with the new organ, the "sickest" patient could
only be expected to live 6 months, whereas the competitor
could be expected to live 20 years. Is it so clear that a
proper choice should yield the result that after 6 months
all parties are dead?
Of course, many hypotheticals could be posed and were
posed to Dr. Barnard. To all these he adamantly gave the
same reply. Fortunately, all chief surgeons do not agree with
Dr. Barnard. Dr. Adrian Kantrowitz feels that congressional
study of this issue is "entirely appropriate."0 0l Also disagree-
ing is the Board on Medicine of the National Academy of
Sciences, who would put the selection in the hands of "expert,
mature physicians," who are unconnected with and independ-
ent of the transplant team.67
Doctors Kiser and Kolff feel that the most equitable
method of selection of kidney transplant recipients, after de-
termining that the condition is irreversibly terminal and
that no other diseases would prevent success, is what might
be termed "first come-first 'saved.' "68 Others prefer that
"the patient should be less than 50 years of age, intelligent
65. SCIENCE NEws, Mar. 23, 1968, at 263.
66. Id. at 262.
67. ScIENCE NEws, Mar. 9, 1968 at 233; SATURDAY REVIEW, Apr. 6,
1968, at 59.
68. Kiser & Kolff, supra note 9, at 11.
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and potentially capable of living a productive life."'6 9 Some
allow a committee of physicians to make an anonymous but
recorded decision; others add lay community leaders to the
committee in order to balance the decision in favor of societal
goals.
It is submitted that, given the fact that only terminal
patients are competitors for the life-giving organs, the only
basis for a medical choice is already foreclosed. The decision
beyond that should reflect the interests of society. Perhaps
several factors, such as donor preference, first in time, po-
tential of a productive life, should all be considered. In any
event, "society, by a process of pragmatic political accommo-
dation, will assign its own priorities." 70
Gifts of the Human Anatomy-Rights and Liabilities. For
the foreseeable future, at least, the source of organs for trans-
planting will be humans-either living or dead. Before med-
ical authorities permit removal from either, of course, they
must make certain the removal is authorized and that no
liability will flow therefrom. Kidneys and other paired or-
gans may be supplied from live donors, and this fact not
only reduces medical but also legal barriers. The medical
barriers are reduced in the case of kidneys because the do-
nated kidney is available at any time and because the donee
can be sustained on the kidney machine while medical prepara-
tion and typing are accomplished. During this time period,
consent of all the parties may be secured. In the case of the
first successful kidney transplant in 1954, the donor and the
donee were minors and the sanction of the court was ob-
tained by means of a declaratory judgment.7 1
But with the advent of the single organ transplants, both
medical and legal problems become more complex. The time
available for the required medical preparation and verifica-
tion of consent is much more limited. The legal problem,
liability for acts done to dead bodies, is a particularly con-
fusing one. The reason for the confusion can be traced to
our English heritage.
Early in the history of England's complicated court system,
the law concerning the dead gradually became the sole con-
69. Id. at 10.
70. Elkinton, supra note 4, at 699.
71. Wasmuth & Stewart, supra note 5, at 446.
[Vol. 20
16
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 5 [2020], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol20/iss5/3
cern of the ecclesiastical courts. The common law courts dealt
only with persons and property; neither category included a
corpse. As to the latter point, it has been asserted that Lord
Coke, in pronouncing the rule of the common law that a
corpse is the property of no one,72 mistook an earlier English
case, Haynes' Case.73 Instead of holding that a body cannot
be property, "[t]he holding was really that there was no
capacity in the body to take a gift and to have property .... -74
Regardless of how the rule became incorporated into the
common law, it remained firmly entrenched well past the
time the common law was received in this country.
The courts of this country, having inherited no common
starting point, began to develop theories of recovery; but, as
might be expected, varied theories resulted, creating con-
fusion. The theories providing for relief for disturbance of
dead bodies can be categorized into three basic approaches-
property, quasi-property, and emotional tort.
The property approach was usually limited to situations
after burial and provided recovery only for disturbance of
the burial accouterments and of the land itself. The body
was still held to be the property of no one both in this
country and in England, 75 and this is still the law.
Struggling with traditional concepts, other courts found
that while there was no property in the ordinary sense;
nevertheless, the survivors had certain rights with respect
to dead bodies. Given the notion that torts may be committed
only upon persons or property, these courts chose to charac-
terize the rights of the survivors as quasi-property rights.7 6
Finally, other jurisdictions, facing up to what was more
nearly the reality of the situation, conceived the notion of an
independent tort, "affording a remedy for injury to the feel-
ings occasioned by interference with dead bodies and their
proper interment. 77
South Carolina cases, though not numerous, do present an
interesting array of situations and theories. In an 1884 case,
72. 3 COKE INST. 203.
73. 12 Coke 113, 77 Eng. Rep. 1389 (c. 1612).
74. P. JACKSON, THE LAW OF CADAVErS 127 (2d ed. 1950).
75. Id. at 126-7.
76. Id. at 133.
77. Id. at 143.
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Griffith v. Charlotte, Columbia & Augusta Railroad7s a mur-
der victim had been placed on the defendant's tracks to make
the death appear accidental. The action for mutilation had
been brought by the administrator of the estate of the de-
ceased, but the court held that the action was without either
common law or statutory basis and denied recovery. In dis-
cussing whether there could be property in a dead body, the
court said that
wherever civilization at least has dawned, or has
commenced to throw even a flickering light upon the
people, reverence for the dead has become a universal
and most sacred sentiment, one which would revolt
at the idea of their remains becoming property .... 79
As to the quasi-property theory, the court said:
But can there not be a qualified property in the dead?
. . . Can it be that there is no legal guardianship
of the dead? And that when life escapes the body
is left . . . without protection, . . . and that those
to whom it was bound in life ... can invoke the aid
of no court in preventing its mutilation? ... [S]uch
seems to be the fact, at least so far as our limited
examination of the cases, both in this country and
in England, . . . has enabled us to ascertain.80
A later case, Osteen v. Southern Railways' concerned the
extortion of an illegal fare for the transportation of the dead
body. Though the defendant's wrongdoing was concerned
soley with causing the burial party mental anguish in their
time of grief, even out of the presence of the body, the
court found it necessary to state:
This court will not commit itself to such a barbarous
and savage doctrine as to hold that when a person
dies no one has such a property interest in the body
as to see the body is decently interred, and resting
place uninterfered with, and a relative or friend has
a right to see that the body is protected, and these
feelings in relation thereto protected.
82
78. 23 S.C. 25 (1884).
79. Id. at 40.
80. Id.
81. 101 S.C. 532, 86 S.E. 30 (1915).
82. Id. at 541, 86 S.E. at 31.
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The last word on the subject was spoken in Simpkins V.
Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co.8 3 But it does no more
to clarify the situation than the two previous cases. In Simp-
kins the widow sought recovery for damaged feelings because
of an autopsy conducted over her objection. Though the case
is cited 4 for the proposition that "the corpse is 'quasi-prop-
erty over which the relatives of the deceased have some
right,'" this is dictum at best because elsewhere the Simpkins
court in finding for the defendant continues:
Our concern in the question here raised is not as
to quasi-property right in the dead body. This is not
an action for the willful and negligent mutilation of
a corpse. The gravamen of the complaint is the al-
leged lack of regard for the plaintiff's feelings, her
humiliation, and embarrassment, and the alleged
trespass on and against her rights in having an
autopsy made upon the body of her dead husband
over her objection. 8
The court held that since the complaint was cast in terms
of "alleged trespass on and against her rights" she was "the
proper person to maintain the action if she [had] a cause
of action."881 It was held that she did not. Thus the Simpkins
court's characterization of the "no property in dead bodies"
rule of Griffitk as dictum could be called by the same name.
So what is the state of the law in this state? The answer
is probably "confused." The only case granting relief was
Osteen, and as the Simpkins court said:
That action involved the question of whether or not
the plaintiff could maintain an action for injury to
his rights and feelings as a passenger brought about
by a threat to breach the contract in making an
unlawful and unjust demand for fare that had al-
ready been paid. This did not involve the question
as to who is a proper party to bring an action for
mutilation to a corpse.
8 7
It can be said, then, that the court has never held who is
a proper party to bring action for wrongful mutilation of
83. 200 S.C. 228 20 S.E.2d 733 (1942).
84. Karesh, Wills and Trust, Survey of S.C. Law, 9 S.C.L. REv. 160,
181 (1956).
85. 200 S.C. 228, 237, 20 S.E.2d 733, 737 (1942) (emphasis added).
86. Id. at 237, 20 S.E.2d at 737.
87. Id. at 233, 20 S.E.2d at 735-36.
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a dead body, but only who is not. And though it has never
reversed Griffith, by way of dictum, it was limited to its
holding.
The point of this review of the status of property rights
in dead bodies is that, in its application to the rights and
liabilities arising from single vital organ donation, it is a
two-edged scalpel. It may cut off the rights of wronged sur-
viving relatives or it may cut off the ability of the donor
to acquiesce in the use of his body after death.
The second half of the problem assumes that the plaintiff
could properly bring an action for wrongful mutilation of
the body of the deceased. What can the willing donor do to
give parts of his anatomy to medical research or to a prospec-
tive donee? What can the doctor do to avoid possible liability
while carrying out the wishes of the deceased? In other
words, can a prospective donor bequeath parts of his anatomy
irrespective of the wishes of his surviving spouse or next-of-
kin? Would the court, by the same reasoning it used to deny
that any property in a body passes to the administrator,
likewise deny that there is any property to pass by means of
a will? This question was raised by Professor Karesh com-
menting upon the passage in 1956 of an Act for Donating
Eyes for Restoration of Sight.88 "Whether the negation of
a corpse as property would likewise entail the discounte-
nancing of a testamentary disposition is problematic." 89 In
the case of cornea donations, Professor Karesh concludes that
the statutory authorization of dispositions by will would be
conclusive of the matter. As to other parts of the body the
eye donation statute may, by negative inference, imply that
without such statutory authorization bequests will be inef-
fective. On the other hand, as Professor Karesh points out,
the court in Simpkins had said: "It is generally conceded by
text writers on the subject that the surviving spouse has a pri-
mary right to the possession of the body and to control the
burial thereof, unless the decedent has by will or otherwise
made a different disposition.''90 According to Professor Ka-
resh: "No question arose under any will, and the italicized
quoted words are dicta, but entitled to some weight.""' It is
88. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 32-701 to -706 (1962).
89. Karesh, Wills and Truset, Survey of S.C. Law, 9 S.C.L. REv. 160,
181 (1956).
90. Simpkins v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 200 S.C. 228, 234, 20
S.E.2d 738, 786 (1942) (emphasis added).
91. Karesh, supra note 89, at 181 n.54.
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doubtful whether the most Samaritan-like surgeon would care
to risk a mutilation law suit on dicta which Professor Karesh
says in a footnote are entitled to "some weight." Indeed, it
has been said there are only a few jurisdictions which do,
in fact, permit testamentary dispositions of this sort, and in
each case the right is statutory in origin.
92
How then should valid acquiescence be arranged? Of course
the release 3 of the next-of-kin could be obtained, but this
will usually be difficult because the donor is frequently the
victim of an accident or other emergency and the next-of-kin
may be unavailable. In securing Dr. Blaiberg's heart, Dr.
Barnard is reported to have been able to secure only the
mother's consent because his bride of three months "was
distraught at the time."' 94 Thus lack of availability of one
or more of the next-of-kin and possible lack of capacity for
informed consent may be difficult barriers in this country.
Perhaps the best approach to the problem would be a stat-
utory authorization of testamentary type distributions. In
1963 South Carolina enacted a statute entitled Gifts of the
Human Anatomy95 which was designed to permit gifts pri-
marily for research purposes but which, by its language, would
permit gifts for any purpose specified by the donor, thereby
including transplantation.
This act, as opposed to the cornea act, does not authorize
the disposition by will but rather by a written, signed docu-
ment executed before two competent witnesses.96 The execu-
tion must be acknowledged before a person authorized to
take acknowledgements, 97 and the document must be filed in
the probate court in the county where the donor resides.98
Revocation may be accomplished by a similarly executed and
filed instrument,9 and therein lies a basic difficulty with the
act. Liability will lie if an organ is removed after a proper
revocation. 100 Once again, the goal of speedy but reliable con-
92. Wasmuth & Stewart, Medical and Legal Aspects of Human Organ
Transplantation, 14 CLEv.-MAR. L. REv. 442, 456 (1965).
93. For sample release forms see id. at 469-71.
94. Lear, A Realistic Look at Heart Transplants, SATURDAY REVIEW,
Feb. 3, 1968, at 56.
95. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 9-521 to -527 (Supp. 1967).
96. Id. § 9-522.
97. Id.
98. Id. 1 9-523.
99. Id. 9-524.
100. Id. 9-526.
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sent is not reached. The recently enacted Massachusetts
statute is better in this regard and provides:
Whoever, in good faith and in reliance upon an in-
strument purporting to make a gift as provided in
section seven, delivers the tissue, the organs or the
whole body or any part of a donor to a donee, shall
not be liable or accountable for having made such
delivery.' 0
The proposed Uniform Anatomical Gift Act provides:
[I]f the gift is evidenced by a properly executed card
or other writing carried on the donor's person or
in his immediate effects, the attending physician at
or following death may, in reliance upon the card
or writing, accept and utilize the gift in his discre-
tion as the agent of the donee. The agent possesses
and may exercise all of the rights and is entitled to
all of the immunities of the donee under this act.
10 2
Further discussion of the details of these and other acts
is beyond the scope of this paper. However, some statutory
authorization for reliable consensual disposition of vital or-
gans is deemed essential for society to utilize the recent
advances in transplantation surgery, and in today's highly
mobile mode of living a uniform law would hopefully solve
the complexities of situations such as the donee's death away
from home.
B. Moral and Ethical Issues
It would indeed be presumptuous to delve into the substance
of the moral and ethical consideration bearing on the recent
medical developments. But the position is here taken, in op-
position to that of Dr. Barnard, that the problems created
are new and are the problems of everyone. And the fact that
numerous organized groups have undertaken studies of the
ethics is offered as evidence.
Somewhat typical was the recent Colloquium on Ethical
Dilemmas from Medical Advances held by the American Col-
lege of Physicians. 103 Admirably, the discussion group was
101. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 113, § 9 (Supp. 1968).
102. UNIFORm ANATOmICAL GMT AcT § 4(c) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1968).
103. Reported in 67 ANNALs oF INTERNAL MEDICINE Supp. 7, No. 3, part
II (1967). Researchers in the field of medical ethics will find particularly
helpful the bibliography at page 69-70 and the Oath of Hippocrates, The
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composed of doctors, lawyers and philosophers among others.
Commenting on the need for involvement outside medical
circles, one speaker said:
The moral problems arising from biomedical prog-
ress are not the exclusive responsibility of biomedical
scientists nor of members of the medical professions.
They are the responsibility of all intelligent people
and will require extensive social consideration before
socially acceptable solutions to these problems may
be agreed upon. 104
While there is more widespread acceptance of the need for
public involvement than Dr. Barnard would have us believe,
there is another side to the ethical coin. Should information
be released to the news media while still possibly premature
or should it be digested first? Traditionally the method was
"quietly establishing facts through experimentation, report-
ing them in detail to a peer scientific society and then in-
terpreting the results to the public."'10 5 Dr. Irvine H. Page,
editor of Modern Medicine, then went on to say, "I am not
prepared to accept the notion that the prime value judgments
of medicine and its ethical standards should be left to public
trial and judgment . ... 1011 Dr. Barnard, as his frequent
television appearances and news releases would indicate, again
disagrees with the prevailing ethics. The consensus seems
to be that the medical aspects of scientific advances should
be discussed, digested, and accepted by physicians and then
the agreed facts should be presented to the public for its
consideration, use and involvement. Apparently, Dr. Barnard,
on the other hand, would place all information instantly in
the public's hands and then go no farther.
Some of this disagreement may stem from another ethical
question. What is "therapy" and what is "experiment?" In-
Declaration of Geneva, the Nuremburg Code, the Declaration of Helsinki,
the AMA Ethical Guidelines for Clinical Investigation, and Supervision
of Experimental Subjects: Recommendations of the Royal College of
Physicians all appended to the Colloquium. Reprints may be obtained from
the Business Office, American College of Physicians, 4200 Pine St., Phila-
delphia, Pa.
104. Leake, Technical Triumphs and Moral Muddles, Colloquium on
Ethical Dilemmas from Medical Advances, 67 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED.
ICINE Supp. 7, No. 3, Part II, at 43, 49 (1967).
105. Page, Instant Reporting-Is It Necessary?, SATURDAY REvmW,
Feb. 3, 1968, at 59.
106. Id.
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deed, Dr. Barnard might agree with reporting experimental
results first to peer groups, for he considers heart transplants,
beginning with the first, as therapy.10 7 But again, the con-
sensus is that it is experimental. 08 The Board of Medicine
of the National Academy of Sciences has said that "the pro-
cedure cannot as yet be regarded as an accepted form of ther-
apy, even a heroic one. It must be clearly viewed for what
it is, a scientific exploration of the unknown . . . ."10 The
more important ethical, and perhaps legal, implications of
this include the criteria for donee selection and obtaining
his consent. He must consent, not to high-risk therapy, but
to permitting the operation in the interests of scientific ad-
vancement. So while the therapy versus experiment question
is considered a problem of medical ethics to the physicians, it
could have a bearing on the legal issue of informed consent.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Reflection upon the problem of how society may best take
advantage of scientific advancements in vital organ trans-
plantation yields ironic conclusions. The body, through its
natural tendency of self-preservation, ironically fights off the
foreign organ or tissue even though the use of the organ
is the body's only chance for survival. Civilized society, on
the other hand, insures its survival by a system of law, part
of which is the largest barrier to full utilization of life-giving
medical techniques.
At this moment there is a fully qualified competent surgi-
cal transplant team at the South Carolina Medical College. 110
These miraculous technical achievements will soon be medi-
cally available at home rather than half way around the
world. But first we need to get our legal house in order.
It is submitted that it is neither logical nor reasonable to
deny each individual the choice of whether or not to donate
part of his anatomy in order that another might live, and
this right should prevail over the interests of his kinsmen.
The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act provides a workable sys-
107. Lear, supra note 94, at 53.
108. Id.; ScIENcn Nnws, Mar. 9, 1968, at 233; SATURDAY REVIEW, Apr.
6, 1968, at 59.
109. SATu DAY REVIEW, Apr. 6, 1968, at 59.
110. However, transplant surgery will be undertaken only when a quali-
fied back-up is available for each position.
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tern under which this right is protected. In addition, of course,
the concept of uniformity here, as elsewhere, is important in
multistate situations. It is suggested, therefore, that South
Carolina seriously consider its adoption at the earliest date.
The adoption of the concept of "brain death" will likewise
facilitate vital organ transplantation. It is not only a more
precise standard for determining at what point still useful
organs may safely be taken, but it also provides the greatest
protection for the patient-donor since it precludes any pos-
sibility that he might otherwise recover. In addition, this con-
cept of death would sanction what physicians often do any-
way-remove the mechanical supports after life has left the
brain. It is submitted that to do otherwise would be to
preserve what is now a useless fiction at tremendous cost both
to the family and to other patients who perhaps could be
benefitted by the machines.
Society, it is to be hoped, will take the necessary steps
to remove the legal fetters from the transplant surgeons,
but it may well not give the doctors the unbridled freedom to
practice their art guided only by their own whim. The choices
and problems in exercising this newly found skill concern the
public, and the public will not be excluded from their con-
sideration: "[A]fter all, they not only are the final arbiters
of the moral standards in our society-they are the pa-
tients"111-and the voters.
EmiL WAmD
111. Elkinton, When Do We Let the Patients Die?, 68 ANNALS OF IN-
TmNAL MniCiNE 695 (1968).
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